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Uber v. Regulation: “Ride-Sharing” Creates
a Legal Gray Area
Yanelys (“Yani”) Crespo*
Technological innovations are quickly re-shaping our world and
even changing the way we travel from place to place. Although
the concept of “ride-sharing” only just emerged in 2010, it has
rapidly gained popularity and expanded across the globe, offering
a new way to get around major cities via a mobile application that
instantly links drivers and passengers through the phone’s GPS
system. At the forefront of this movement is Uber—the multibillion-dollar company and pioneer of ride-sharing that has
experienced unprecedented growth and success in its short
existence. However, Uber’s expansion into most major cities
across the United States has not been free of controversy or
difficulties. For example, Uber has received major pushback from
the taxi industry, which was once virtually free of competition, but
is now quickly losing its grasp as a popular mode of
transportation in the markets Uber has expanded into. In addition,
city and state regulators in highly-regulated markets such as
Miami, Florida have created significant legal hurdles for
companies like Uber to enter into new markets based primarily on
the regulators’ inability to fit these innovative companies into
existing regulations for taxis, resulting in a legal gray area. This
article will examine the development of the immensely popular
and controversial ride-sharing industry. Specifically, this article
will focus on the unprecedented growth of the ride-sharing
industry’s pioneer, Uber, and the legal hurdles Uber has
encountered while expanding into highly-regulated markets,
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INTRODUCTION

The past five years have brought with them groundbreaking
technological innovations. Perhaps the most significant innovation has
been the emergence of a new economy in which individuals engage in
peer-to-peer transactions through companies that have created
groundbreaking digital platforms to connect consumers.1 This new form
of collaborative consumption is commonly referred to as “The Sharing
Economy”—the concept of “internet-based sharing of underutilized space,
skills, and stuff,” including time, for both monetary and non-monetary
benefits.2 The sharing economy facilitates and fosters “community
ownership, localized production, sharing and cooperation, small-scale
enterprise,” and economic and environmental consciousness.3
Historically, the legal system was not intended to regulate
relationships in a technologically-driven shared environment.4 Rather,
“our laws were designed to regulate relationships in a competitive
economy, not a collaborative one.”5 Generally, “the law tends to prefer
binary divisions,”6 which companies in the sharing economy do not
particularly follow and tend to stray away from, “resulting in a legal gray
area.”7 City regulators and the legal system alike have resisted the concept
of “ride-sharing,” facilitated through mobile applications by companies
such as Uber and Lyft8.These ride-sharing companies demand a change in
the law that they believe is inevitable. However, regulators have the
difficult task of determining where these companies fit within existing
laws; this determination has created a number of legal issues for ridesharing companies in many of the cities where they have expanded, which
this Commend will discuss in detail.
The ride-sharing sector is home to companies such as Uber, which
offers the appeal of a private driver with the ease of hailing a taxi.9 In most
1

See Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the
Sharing Economy, 58 BOS. B.J., Spring 2014, at 34.
2
Id.
3
Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 2 (2012)
4
See id. at 13.
5
Id.
6
Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 1, at 34.
7
Id. (emphasis added).
8
As of December 31, 2015, Sidecar ceased its operations as a ride and delivery service
and no longer exists. See Sunil Paul, So long Sidecar and thanks, Median.com (Dec. 29,
2015), https://medium.com/@SunilPaul/so-long-sidecar-and-thanks-74c8a0955064#.1fl7
ckujm.
9
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Regulators wreck Uber innovation: Column, USA TODAY
(June 10, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/06/09/uber-lyft-taxi-trans
portation-regulators-column/10198131/.
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cities, taxi and limo services operate in a non-market economy heavily
regulated with rules prohibiting and even criminalizing competition.10
Consequently, without competition, these regulated industries have few
incentives to innovate, leading to mediocre performance and quality.11
When Uber and other ride-sharing companies burst their way into this
monopolistic industry, regulators responded by fining drivers, impounding
vehicles, and, in some cases, banning the services outright.12 The fact is
that ride-sharing companies threaten the very existence of taxi companies
by merely competing with them. Simply put, regulation and innovation do
not work together in the current regulatory scheme.13
This article will look into the development of the ride-sharing
movement and its major companies, Uber and Lyft, in Part II. In Part III,
this article will focus on Uber, discussing how it was started, how it works,
and its successful expansions into three cities across the United States.
Then, in Part IV, this article will discuss Uber’s major challenges and
controversies with the legal system and city regulators, including existing
regulations, insurance issues, safety concerns, and driver liability. Finally,
in Part V, this article will present an argument for potential solutions for
Uber and its adversaries to coexist in the transportation industry.

II.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF “RIDE-SHARING”

The Trend Toward a Sharing Economy: Legal Conundrums

In the sharing economy, individuals can share rooms (or couches) in
their homes, seats in their cars, parking spaces, money, and even time in
the day.14 What initially began as small-scale, not-for-profit sharing has
become a big business.15 In 2013, Forbes estimated that the sharing
economy generated approximately $3.5 billion in revenue.16 A report
issued by PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) estimated that the five main
sharing economy sectors generated $15 billion in global revenues in
2014.17 By 2025, these same sectors could generate potential revenue
10

See infra note 223.
See id.
12
See id.
13
See Kassan & Orsi, supra note 3, at 13.
14
Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 1, at 34.
15
See id.
16
Id.
17
John Hawksworth & Robert Vaughan, The sharing economy – sizing the revenue
opportunity, PWC, http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/collisions/sharingeconomy
/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue-opportunity.jhtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2016)
(explaining that the five main sharing sectors are peer-to-peer lending and crowd-funding,
online staffing, peer-to-peer accommodation, car sharing, and music and video streaming).
11
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worth over $335 billion.18 These staggering opportunities for growth and
revenue have enticed many to join this access-driven, sharing movement.
However, not everyone has embraced this collaborative consumption
methodology. For example, industries like hotels and taxis, which had
been relatively without competition for years, have had to cope with these
new, innovative companies entering and disrupting the market.19 These
industries argue “that the upstart companies are not complying with health,
safety, insurance, tax, and other regulations.”20 Many city officials across
the country tend to agree with them.
The main challenge in this new economy is that the sharing platforms
do not fit into our current legal framework. At the forefront of this
dilemma is the fact that our laws were not designed to regulate
collaborative relationships, transactions, and organizations.21 Instead, our
legal system was primarily developed to manage economic, binary
relationships—i.e., public and private, employer and employee, landlord
and tenant, producer and consumer.22 However, “in the sharing economy,
many of these relationships overlap;” as such, it can be difficult to
determine which laws or regulations (if any) may apply.23 This legal gray
area has created incredibly difficult legal obstacles and inconveniences for
those seeking to enter new markets. Many cities have addressed these
issues by either creating exemptions or new regulations for these
companies, or simply prohibiting them from operating in their cities.24
No matter how the various local governments choose to deal with the
collaborative companies of this new economy, the issues that come with
regulating digital platforms in the sharing territory are guaranteed to
change the legal landscape significantly. Those changes in the legal
landscape of the once stable transportation industry are beginning to take
form in many urban cities through the enactment of new laws and
regulations specially tailored for ride-sharing companies. The recent fastpaced growth towards a sharing economy invariably means that even the
most highly-regulated markets will need to re-evaluate and re-develop
their current legal framework to include the collaborative companies of
this new economy.

18

Id.
See Deven R. Desai, The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization, and
Disruption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1477 (2014).
20
Id.
21
Kassan & Orsi, supra note 3, at 13.
22
See id. at 13-14.
23
Id. at 14.
24
Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 1, at 36.
19
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B.

Transportation Alternatives in the Sharing Economy

Amidst resistance from many highly regulated cities like Miami and
Las Vegas, the idea of sharing cars and other forms of transportation has
taken hold in most major urban settings.25 The ride-sharing movement
took off in 2010—a time when the country was re-emerging from a severe
economic recession, social media was booming, and smartphones were
becoming a commonplace necessity for most.26 The sharing economy
basically developed out of a dire need for access to things that many
individuals either did not or could not afford to own themselves.27 “Access
trumps ownership because it gives you a lot of freedom and flexibility and
choice, without a lot of the hassles of ownership, including high fixed
costs.”28 With mobile ride-sharing apps like Uber, Lyft, and previously
Sidecar,29 passengers get the use and benefits of an automobile without
having to own one.30 Ride-sharing companies have presented those who
cannot afford the cost of gasoline, car payments, and insurance with a
viable and necessary transportation alternative.
Ride-sharing companies do not actually own any vehicles, but instead
act primarily “as technology platforms that connect clients with drivers
through a smartphone app.”31 “Riders are connected with drivers using
their phones’ GPS,” which acts much like the functional equivalent of
25

See Sonari Glinton, For Ridesharing Apps Like Lyft, Commerce is a Community, NPR:
(Nov. 14, 2013, 4:56 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltech
considered/2013/11/14/245242805/for-ridesharing-apps-like-lyft-commerce-is-a-commu
nity.
26
Id.
27
See id.
28
Id.
29
Sidecar was a ride-sharing company founded in San Francisco in 2012, pioneering the
way for Uber and Lyft by offering a “ride marketplace” model in which passengers could
quickly hail a driver through use of the app for a very low price in major U.S. cities. Unlike
its competitors, Sidecar’s app allowed passengers to choose a driver based on price made
available to passengers before the driver is matched. Moreover, Sidecar did not participate
in surge pricing during peaks of high demand. See Reuters, Rideshare Pioneer Sidecar Hits
Exit Ramp, Will Shut Down Thursday, NBCNEWS.COM (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.
nbcnews.com/business/business-news/rideshare-pioneer-sidecar-hits-exit-ramp-will-shutdown-thursday-n487951. Despite its contribution to innovation in the ride-share industry,
Sidecar ultimately shut down its ride-share and delivery services on December 29, 2015.
The closure of the company was due, in large part, to the immense competition, investor
funding, and continued growth of Uber and Lyft into new markets versus Sidecar’s
availability in only a handful of cities, minimal funding compared to its competitors, and
lack of sufficient market saturation to compete. See Carolyn Said, Ride-sharing pioneer
Sidecar to shut down ride, delivery service, SF GATE (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.sfgate.
com/business/article/Ride-sharing-pioneer-Sidecar-to-shut-down-ride-6726144.php.
30
See Glinton, supra note 25.
31
John G. Browning, Emerging Technology and Its Impact on Automotive Legislation,
91 DEF. COUNS. J. 83, 84 (2014).
ALL TECH CONSIDERED
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hailing the nearest taxi.32 The drivers, who use the app in the same way as
the riders, may be individuals or existing car services.33 The companies
promote their services as a way to better utilize the empty seats in most
cars, thus lowering fuel usage and transportation costs. In addition, these
services can serve areas not covered by a public transit system and are also
capable of serving spontaneous, one-time trips.34 As revolutionary as it
seems, the concept of ride-sharing is not “new”; it works much the same
way as carpooling and hitchhiking.35 “What is different is the
technology”—with the use of a smartphone, users have the ability to
instantly find a driver and quickly catch a ride across the city.36
Although ride-sharing has many benefits, it has been controversial for
various reasons. First, most states and major cities throughout the U.S.
have regulations for taxi services, some of which can be extremely strict
and difficult to comply with.37 Second, because ride-sharing companies
stress that they do not provide transportation services, opponents argue
that the companies “circumvent the regulations and licensing fees that
taxicab [and limo] companies have to contend with.”38 Lastly, issues
regarding insurance, liability, and safety have created numerous problems
for ride-sharing companies wishing to enter highly regulated markets.39
Simply put, “[t]hese are 21st century businesses that are operating with 20th
century laws.”40

C.

Major Players in Ride-Sharing
1. Uber: “Everyone’s Private Driver”

Founded in 2009 by Travis Kalanick, Uber provides city residents in
over 300 cities worldwide with a convenient and efficient way to request
transportation services from existing transportation providers and
independent drivers.41 Uber launched its operations in San Francisco
32

Id.
Id.
34
See Kassan & Orsi, supra note 3, at 11.
35
Mark Murphy, Ride-sharing services: When to use them and when to avoid them,
Travel, FOX NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2014/10/06/rideshari
ng-services-when-to-use-them-and-avoid-them/.
36
Id.
37
See Browning, supra note 31, at 84.
38
Id.
39
See id. at 85.
40
Id. (footnote omitted).
41
Travis Kalanick, Uber Policy White Paper 1.0: Principled Innovation: Addressing
The Regulatory Ambiguity Around Ridesharing Apps, BLOG.UBER (Apr. 12, 2013),
http://blog.uber.com/2013/04/12/uber-policy-white-paper-1-0/ [http://www.benedelman.
org/uber/uber-policy-whitepaper.pdf] [hereinafter Kalanick, Uber Policy White Paper].
33
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during the summer of 2010 with only a few cars and a handful of
employees.42 Initially, Uber worked almost exclusively with commercially
licensed, insured, and regulated entities to provide rides via professional
drivers.43 “After entering credit-card information on the app, anyone could
summon a car with the press of a button.”44 The smartphone’s GPS then
pinpoints the user’s location for pickup, and the cost of the ride is
automatically charged to the customer’s account (including tip).45 By
finding a safe, efficient, and cost-effective way to link passengers and
drivers, Uber has revolutionized the transportation industry.
In 2012, a “host of clone companies,” i.e., Lyft and Sidecar, emerged
in the market, offering “incredibly low-cost transportation by working
exclusively with unlicensed, non-commercially insured vehicles and
drivers.”46 These companies referred to their approach as “ride-sharing.”47
CEO Kalanick observed the effect these companies had in highly regulated
markets for over a year, choosing to avoid participation due to the
regulatory risks involved.48 However, because of the regulatory ambiguity
for this new form of transportation, Kalanick believed Uber was
disadvantaging itself by not participating in ride-sharing.49 Thus, Kalanick
created a ride-sharing policy for Uber, which included various safeguards
and insurance standards above and beyond what local regulators had in
place in most cities.50
In response to competition by Lyft and Sidecar, Uber launched UberX
in July 2012 as an affordable alternative to its luxury UberBlack
counterpart.51 Advertised as the low-cost Uber, UberX has transformed the
manner in which urban city dwellers get around.52 UberX now offers
private drivers to the masses at a low cost, something that was once
considered a luxury; it has become Uber’s main source of revenue since
2013.53 Today, Uber offers seven different transportation services: UberX,

42

Kara Swisher, Man and Uber Man, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2014, http://www.vanityfair.
com/business/2014/12/uber-travis-kalanick-controversy.
43
Kalanick, Uber Policy White Paper, supra note 41.
44
Swisher, supra note 42.
45
Id.
46
Kalanick, Uber Policy White Paper, supra note 41.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See Tess Russell, The New UberX: Better, Faster and Cheaper Than a Taxi, UBER
NEWSROOM (June 11, 2013), https://newsroom.uber.com/us-california/uberx-cheaper-than
-a-taxi/.
52
Mickey Rapkin, Uber Cab Confessions, GQ, Mar. 2014, http://www.gq.com/news-po
litics/newsmakers/201403/uber-cab-confessions.
53
See id.
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UberTaxi, UberBlack, UberSUV, UberLux, and in select cities, UberPool
and UberHighway.54
Uber’s explosive success can be attributed, in part, to the ease of using
the service in cities where taxis are a subpar form of transportation. “No
longer do people need to search for those elusive taxi stands, wonder about
tipping practices . . . [or] find the right way to ask for a receipt. Uber takes
care of all of that.”55 Uber’s rapid growth can also be attributed to its
successful social media campaigns and utilization of political advocacy
amidst heavy regulation and opposition.56 According to an article by the
Washington Post, “local lobbying registration records indicate that [Uber]
has hired private lobbyists in at least 50 U.S. cities and states, and has hired
at least 161 people to lobby for its interests.”57 In addition, Uber’s vast
influence on its users has attracted bipartisan interest from politicians,
including President Obama’s former campaign manager, David Plouffe,
who now acts as the company’s Senior Vice President of Policy and
Strategy.58

2. Lyft: “A ride whenever you need one”
Uber’s biggest rival is Lyft—a San Francisco-based mobile car service
app co-founded by John Zimmer (COO) and Logan Green (CEO).59 Lyft
launched its beta test phase in San Francisco on August 28, 2012,60 and
has since expanded into 209 cities throughout the U.S. with plans to
expand globally.61 Using the Lyft app, “people can see other drivers who
are nearby, how long it will take for a car to arrive and request a ride.”62
Lyft’s services were designed around affordability– a ride with Lyft is
roughly thirty percent less than the same ride in a taxi.63 Moreover, Lyft’s
services were initially cheaper than Uber’s only service offered at the time,
54

See generally UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
Mohamed A. El-Erian, Uber and the Coming Disruption of Finance,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-10-22/
uber-and-the-coming-disruption-of-finance.
56
See T.C. Sottek, Uber has an army of at least 161 lobbyists and they’re crushing
regulators, THE VERGE (Dec. 14, 2014, 2:55 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/14
/7390395/uber-lobbying-steamroller.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See Sam Gustin, Lyft: Ride-Sharing Startup Zimride Hits the Gas Pedal in San
Francisco, TIME (Sept. 4, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/09/04/need-a-lyft-ridesharing-startup-zimride-hits-the-gas-pedal/.
60
Id.
61
See generally LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/cities (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
62
Tomio Geron, Will Ride-Sharing Apps Replace Car Ownership?, FORBES (July 9,
2012, 8:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/07/09/will-ride-sharingapps-replace-car-ownership/.
63
See id.
55

88

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:79

which functioned more like a private chauffeur until the development of
UberX.64
Under Lyft’s original vision, every Lyft ride would be unique, as
drivers were encouraged to customize their cars and welcome passengers
to sit up front with them.65 In addition, the signature pink mustaches on
Lyft vehicles helped spread the word about Lyft and fostered brand
recognition.66 Lyft initially did not charge passengers for their rides, but
instead suggested donations, which could be given to the driver after each
ride via the smart phone app.67 However, Lyft quickly changed its
donations concept to payments that are charged from a passenger’s credit
card information stored in the app upon completion of the ride.68 Today,
Lyft offers three ways to ride—Lyft, Lyft Plus, and Lyft Line.69
Uber and Lyft have been engaged in a fierce competition to be the goto app for replacing taxis and other transportation services.70 However,
Uber seems to have the upper hand, “dominating [Lyft] in terms of
revenue, riders, revenue per rider, and absolute growth rates.”71 According
to a report from Future Advisor tracking data from June 2013 to May 2014,
“Uber was seeing revenues twelve times that of Lyft, with $26.4 million
going to Uber and $2.2 million going to Lyft.”72 In addition, during that
same time period, Uber “provided more than seven times the rides that
Lyft [did]” and “added new customers about five times faster,” despite
Uber charging more per ride.73 Although the services may appear
interchangeable, the report found that “only 2.5% of all riders used both
services, showing that there are few who aren’t loyal to one over
another.”74
Amidst the heated competition, Lyft has worked its way into
practically every conversation about the ride-sharing industry alongside its
rival, Uber. As of September 2014, the Lyft service “book[ed] 2 million
64

Id.
Kim Lyons, Is Lyft too friendly to battle Uber?, PITT. POST GAZETTE (Dec. 19, 2014,
11:40 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/transportation/2014/12/19/Lyft-leaves-ro
om-for-creativity/stories/201412190015.
66
See id.
67
Catherine Gacad, Anything But a Taxi . . . Comparing Lyft, Sidecar, and Uber,
DOTCOMPLICATED (Sept. 18, 2013), http://dotcomplicated.co/content/2013/09/anything-but
-a-taxi-comparing-lyft-sidecar-and-uber/.
68
See generally LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/how (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
69
See id.
70
Rebecca Borison, REPORT: Uber Generates 12x More Revenue Than Lyft, Despite
Charging More Per Ride, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2014, 1:18 PM), http://www.businessin
sider.com/uber-12x-revenue-over-lyft-2014-9 [hereinafter, Borison, REPORT].
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
65
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rides per month, and . . . gross revenue [was] up 40 percent month over
month.”75 That same September, CEO Zimmer also announced that the
company is looking to expand to 100 cities globally during 2015.76 Lyft
markets its services as a fun and socially interactive transportation
alternative, while Uber originally prided itself on offering a refined,
private and professional transportation service.77 Uber’s CEO has referred
to Lyft as a clone; however, Lyft’s CEO disagrees: “We launched in
2012 . . . .There was no peer-to-peer or low-cost competitor. So we
innovated in this space.”78

III.
A.

UBER

Why Uber?

Valued at over $50 billion,79 Uber has become more valuable in its
mere six years of existence than any other start-up in recent years,
including the technology giants Facebook, Google, and Amazon.80 In fact,
there have only been two venture capital-backed companies that have
exceeded the $50-billion mark: Facebook and now Uber.81 Notably, Uber
happened to reach that $50-billion mark two years earlier than Facebook,
which reached its valuation in seven years versus Uber’s five.82 Backed by
technology giants (and corporate rivals) such as Microsoft and Google,
Uber aims at immersive global expansion and investing in new and
innovative technologies.83
From 2013 to 2014, “Uber [sic] expanded from 60 cities in 21
countries . . . to 250 cities in 50 countries . . . .”84 As of June 2015, Uber
had approximately one million drivers operating in 300 cities across 58

75

Josh Lipton, Lyft may expand to 100 cities globally in 2015, CNBC (Sept. 17, 2014,
3:01 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102009880#.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Douglas MacMillan & Telis Demos, Uber Valued at More Than $50 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (July 31, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion1438367457.
80
Al Ramadan, Christopher Lochhead, & Dave Peterson, Behind Uber’s soaring value,
FORTUNE (Dec. 11, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/11/behind-ubers-soaring-value/.
81
MacMillan & Demos, supra note 87.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Tracey Lien & Andrea Chang, Now worth $40 billion, upstart Uber outraces other
tech models, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014, 6:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fiuber-funding-20141205-story.html.
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countries.85 Uber was the first of its kind in the peer-to-peer transportation
industry, and it created brand recognition for itself by offering
professional, consistent, and efficient service to its passengers. Unlike
other companies in the over $40-billion club (e.g., Time Warner Cable and
Delta Airlines), Uber has little overhead because most of the drivers are
not on payroll, but rather get paid for the rides they give, with Uber “taking
a percentage of each transaction between driver and passenger.”86 Notably,
at its current growth rate, “the Uber platform is generating 20,000 new
driver jobs every month,” with UberX drivers earning median incomes of
over $70,000 per year in established cities.87 Furthermore, “the Uber
platform generates $2.8 billion per year for the U.S. economy, and [that
number] is growing.”88 Apart from the economic benefits, Uber’s presence
in a city contributes to less incidents involving impaired driving,
improving the welfare and safety of many major U.S. cities.89
Although Uber’s entry into the transportation market created
opportunities for competition, Uber has maintained a position far ahead of
its competition.90 For example, the rental company Hertz “has a market
capitalization of $11 billion—about one-fourth of Uber’s.”91 In addition,
as of May 2014, Uber’s revenue was twelve times that of its largest rival,
Lyft.92 By mid-2015, Uber was taking market share from taxis and other
transportation services at an alarming rate. Based on expense reports from
business travelers in the first quarter of 2015, Certify, an expense
management company specializing in small businesses, reported that “an
average of 46 percent of all total paid car rides were through Uber in major
markets across the U.S.”93 In contrast, “the percentage of rides in taxis,
limos and shuttles fell from 85 percent to 53 percent over the same
period.”94 Although Uber’s competitors offer essentially the same service,
Uber has “focused on getting consumers to understand what the company
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is about, and it made itself attractive to potential drivers.”95 Early on, Uber
established itself as a household name, and many people now associate
taking a ride via a ride-sharing app with “taking an Uber.”96
Although Uber has been extremely popular with its users, “the
company has faced significant pushback from the taxi cab industry and
state and federal regulators.”97 These opponents believe that the ridesharing companies need regulation, which “requires balancing the safety
and welfare of the public with the potential for new economic development
opportunities.”98 In contrast, “proponents, typically a younger, urban
demographic,” view the backward-looking regulations “as protectionism,
serving entrenched operators in the market like taxicabs and hotels.”99
Despite the opposition, with Uber’s current influx of investments, the
company will be well equipped to take on the taxi industry, politicians,
negative press, and any other hurdles it may encounter.

B.

Successful Expansions
1. Chicago, Illinois

Uber announced its expansion into Chicago on September 22, 2011—
making it one of the first few cities with the service.100 Prior to Uber’s
official launch in Chicago, over 1,000 users had signed up to use the
service in the windy city.101 CEO Kalanick believed Chicago could
potentially be the highest growth market for Uber, partially due to the
nightlife, the large number of sports arenas, and the frigid weather for most
of the year, which makes it nearly impossible to hail a taxi.102
At the time of Uber’s launch, the black car industry in Chicago was
not as heavily regulated, as opposed to other cities that make it nearly
impossible for Uber and its drivers to operate.103 However, about one year
after Uber’s entry into Chicago, the city’s Department of Business Affairs
and Consumer Protection “proposed regulations that would prohibit
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Uber’s black car service from operating in Chicago.”104 Uber responded
by sending thousands of emails and tweets to its users asking them to sign
their petition, utilizing the hash tag #UberCHILove.105 Uber customers in
Chicago reacted so powerfully that politicians postponed their decision,
even though the bill was ultimately approved and later vetoed by the
Governor after Uber proposed the possibility of bringing hundreds of jobs
to Chicago if the bill was vetoed and/or amended.106
After years of negotiations, on December 3, 2014, Illinois lawmakers
approved a bill that places certain insurance and safety standards on ridesharing companies.107 The bill effectively allowed ride-sharing companies
to legally operate in Illinois, something Uber publicized “as a compromise
bill that prioritizes rider safety while preserving transportation choices and
economic opportunity for drivers.”108 About one week after the ridesharing bill was passed, Chicago regulators approved a plan to create apps
“that would allow users to hail taxis from various operators in the city,
using a smartphone.”109 The app-creating plan is part of the “Taxi Driver
Fairness Reforms package,” which would update outdated taxicab
regulations.110 According to Chicago’s Mayor Rahm Emanuel, “These
reforms represent what is necessary to further modernize this growing
industry.”111
Since the company’s 2013 launch of UberX in Chicago, “Uber has
more than 20,000 active driver-partners on its platform, who have
collectively earned over $200 million . . . doing more than two million
trips per month in Chicago alone.”112 Despite some hurdles, Uber has
continued to expand rapidly throughout the Chicago market, planning to
hire 10,000 more drivers.113 In the words of Uber’s Chief Advisor Plouffe,
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“The Windy City is a wonderful example of what can happen when
ridesharing is able to grow and thrive.”114

2. Washington D.C.
On December 15, 2011, Uber announced that it would be rolling into
Washington D.C., making the District its sixth launch.115 The service was
an instant hit with city residents, but the city’s taxi commissioner and other
officials began impounding cars and ticketing drivers one month later.116
Amidst the negative backlash and publicity, Uber never stopped
operating—the kind of resistance that the company has shown in virtually
every market.117
When Uber introduced its low-cost UberX in July 2012, D.C. city
officials responded by making it nearly impossible for UberX to be a
viable option.118 The D.C. City Council informed Uber, just days before
the company’s launch of UberX, of its intention “to pass an amendment to
the taxi modernization bill that would make it illegal for Uber to lower its
prices or to offer a low cost service in any form.”119 The transportation bill
introduced by councilwoman Mary Cheh, literally called “Uber
Amendments,” would effectively require Uber to set their minimum fare,
even for short trips, at “no less than 5 times a taxi’s minimum fare.”120 As
it had done in Chicago, Uber vehemently fought back. The company
reached out to users asking for support, sending tens of thousands of
emails and tweets with the hash tag #UberDCLove.121 Ultimately, Cheh
reversed the amendment and “sponsored a nearly inverse piece of
legislation that establishes a legal framework for ‘digital dispatch’ in the
district.”122
On October 28, 2014, amid hundreds of protesting taxi drivers, the
Washington D.C. City Council voted to approve “the Vehicle for Hire
Innovation Amendment Act of 2014,” which allows “app-based car
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services [like Uber] to continue operating permanently in the District.”123
In sum, “the amendment establishes a legal framework to regulate the appbased companies,” including “requirements that drivers be at least 21, pass
a criminal background check, hold liability insurance, and have their cars
undergo safety checks.”124 Uber applauded the District’s “smart, more
modern regulation,” which is the kind that Uber seeks in every market it
enters.125 Uber executive Plouffe commented that the new legislation in
D.C. was a model for other cities.126
While it seems like Uber has won, the D.C. taxi industry is not waving
a white flag just yet. In December 2014, the D.C. Taxicab Commission
announced “that it would begin beta testing the ‘Universal D.C. TaxiApp’
in March [of 2015].”127 Through the app, “[r]iders will be able to hail one
of the city’s 7,000 licensed taxis if they’re in the area, but private services
like Uber and Lyft will still be allowed.”128 D.C. will be the first city to
launch its own app of this kind, but major cities like Chicago and New
York are also working on similar apps.129 On the heels of the upcoming
presidential election in 2016, the “on-demand economy” companies have
fueled debates among the candidates for both the Republican and
Democratic parties.130 With Uber at the forefront, the impact of the ridesharing economy has reached precedential heights.

3. Denver, Colorado
On September 7, 2012, Uber announced it would be launching its
services in Denver, Colorado.131 After just six months in the city, Uber had
123
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attracted tens of thousands of registered users.132 However, after numerous
complaints from the city’s taxi and limo drivers, the Colorado Public
Utilities Commission “proposed new or amended rules that would
effectively drive Uber out of the state.”133 These rules were never
approved; and instead, in June 2014, Colorado became the first state to
enact legislation that authorized the use of mobile ride-sharing apps.134
Colorado’s “Transportation Network Company Act” places specific
insurance and safety requirements on companies like Uber and Lyft.135
Uber spokeswoman Eva Behrend praised the Colorado legislators’
decision: “Colorado is on the cutting-edge of innovation and technology.
Their leaders understand that laws should not stand in the way of consumer
choice, innovation and the natural evolution of the way people
travel . . . .”136
Colorado’s landmark legislation has brought with it progressive
improvements for ride-sharing companies, including Denver International
Airport’s decision to allow Uber and Lyft to operate at its main terminal.137
Although the taxicab industry is still trying to fight ride-sharing in Denver,
most have accepted and even embraced it. For instance, after an incident
where a Denver police officer mistakenly told an Uber driver from Seattle
that he was giving illegal rides, the Denver Police Department responded
by establishing a new training program for its officers.138 The training was
established as a means to ensure that all officers were aware of current
ride-sharing legislation regulating these now legal means of
transportation.139 As of June 2015, Uber sought to recruit 1,000 more
drivers for the Denver metropolitan area to meet the high demand for its
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services.140 In a statement, Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper praised
Uber’s willingness to hire drivers and create new and additional earning
opportunities for Colorado’s residents.141

IV.

UBER’S CHALLENGES AND CONTROVERSIES

A.
Highly-Regulated Taxi Industries: Uber’s Launch in
Miami, Florida
After a slew of emails, tweets, and phone calls from thousands of
South Florida residents demanding better transportation options, Uber
finally launched its UberX service in Miami on June 4, 2014.142 Following
months of lobbying in Tallahassee to change taxi laws in South Florida,
Uber decided to ignore the regulations and enter the lucrative market.
Miami-Dade County’s taxi laws effectively ban ride-sharing companies
from operating legally, as vehicles-for-hire are subject to burdening
restrictions.143 For example, a passenger is required to request a vehicle an
hour before the pick-up time.144 Further, Miami-Dade’s stringent
regulation “requires limos and black cars to charge a minimum fare that is
more than three times the hourly rate of taxi cabs, a price currently set at
$80 . . . with the required two-hour minimum, or $70 for a one-stop
ride.”145 Miami-Dade is not alone in treating the companies as unlicensed
taxi services—Austin, Las Vegas, New Orleans, and Portland are just
some of the other cities trying to keep out the ride-sharing companies.146
In Miami and many other large cities, taxicab drivers are required to
carry “medallions”—“the prohibitively expensive for-hire licenses”
needed to legally operate a cab in the city.147 “Miami-Dade has a fixed
140

Greg Avery, Uber Expanding in Colorado, Looks for Thousands More Drivers, DENV.
BUS. J. (June 11, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/boosters_bits/2015/06/
uber-expanding-in-colorado-looks-for-thousands.html.
141
Id.
142
Natalia Montalvo, ¡Hola Miami!, UBER: NEWSROOM (June 4, 2014), http://blog.uber.
com/miamilaunch.
143
Donna Tam, Miami Officials Propose Law Changes to Allow Uber Service, C NET
(June 13, 2013, 11:47 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/miami-officials-propose-law-chan
ges-to-allow-uber-service/.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade Looks to Other Cities in Struggle to Deal with Lyft,
Uber, MIAMI HERALD (June 21, 2014, 6:16 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/06/21
/4191799/miami-dade-looks-to-other-cities.html.
147
Raymond Francois, Taxi Drivers are Lyft and Uber Drivers, Too, MIAMI HERALD
(July 21, 2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/07/21/4246926/taxi-driver
s-are-lyft-and-uber.html.

2016-2017]

UBER V. REGULATION

97

number of taxi medallions—2,121—each worth more than $300,000.”148
Similarly, in cities like New York, Boston, and Chicago, the price of
medallions has at times surpassed $1 million, $700,000, and $350,000,
respectively.149 The majority of cab drivers cannot afford to own one of
these pricey permits; these drivers have to pay anywhere from $550 to
$750 per week to taxi companies that own or administer the medallions
just to be able to lease these licenses and operate legally.150 In addition,
drivers can get removed from the taxi company’s insurance for any small
accident unless the drivers “pay the company $2,000 and fix the car
[themselves], as the cab company’s insurance only covers the passengers,”
not the drivers or their cars.151
The exploitative conditions of Miami’s taxi industry have caused
many cab drivers to switch over to Uber and Lyft. In a Miami Herald oped written by Miami taxicab driver Raymond Francois, he describes the
unfair practices and conditions faced by most cab drivers in South
Florida.152 Francois states that the job of a taxi driver is among the top ten
lowest-paying and most dangerous jobs in the U.S.153 Many members of
the New Vision Taxi Drivers Association in Miami, including Francois,
support legalizing Uber and Lyft and have turned to the companies in
desperation, as most of them make poverty-level wages.154 “When we
work with taxi companies, we pay them 80 percent of what we make; when
we drive for Uber or Lyft, we keep 80 percent of what we make.”155
Although Uber has immense financial backing and the support of its
loyal users, the city’s established taxicab companies and their owners,
“ . . . with their decades-long foothold in the community, have a stronger
grip on local politics.”156 Miami-Dade has issued $2,000 in fines to Uber
and Lyft drivers and even impounded vehicles in some cases; however,
Uber and Lyft took care of the penalties and continued operating in the
city.157Amidst the taxi companies’ resistance and after months of operating
illegally in Miami, “the Miami-Dade County Commission gave initial
approval [on July 15, 2014,] to a proposal legalizing the ride-sharing
148
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companies’” services in the city.158 The legislation would allow ridesharing companies to operate in Miami under a new section of the county’s
regulations.159 However, as of April 2015, County commissioners
“declined to endorse a legislative package that would give Uber, Lyft and
other app-based car services permission to run competing services against
Miami-Dade’s taxi companies.”160
In early January 2016, through the use of its popular app-based
political advocacy efforts, Uber pounced on Miami-Dade commissioners
who had proposed legislation that would make it “impossible” for Uber to
continue to operate in the city.161 And, as has been the case in many other
cities, Uber’s efforts prevailed, as the Miami-Dade County Commission
withdrew proposed rules that Uber stated would drive it out of the city if
passed.162 In a surprising move, the commissioners responded to the
withdrawn legislation by giving “preliminary approval to rival legislation
that Uber supports and the taxi industry opposes.”163 The commissioners’
preliminary vote moved Uber’s heated debate in Miami involving
entrenched interests and the regulated industries they influence one step
closer to a legally operating Uber in Miami.164
Despite the unclear legal situation in Miami, Uber continued to
vehemently defy authority and continued to operate throughout Florida,
showing the company’s resilience in the face of adversity. In July 2015,
Uber revealed its plans to maintain its presence in South Florida,
announcing the opening of its Miami headquarters in the popular
metropolitan Brickell area.165 With the support of Miami-Dade Mayor
Carlos Gimenez, it appears that Uber is here to stay: “I can’t believe that
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we claim to be a 21st Century city and it is not legal here. If it were legal
here, I would probably be using it here. It is the future and it is here.”166
Finally, on May 3, 2016, Uber’s efforts to keep Uber in Miami paid
off – after nine hours of debates and commentary, Miami-Dade
commissioners passed ordinances that legalized the Uber business model
on a 9-2 vote.167 Apart from legalizing the business model of ride-sharing
companies, the County Commissioners also voted to adopt “legislation
that . . . dismantles some of the county’s regulation of taxis and shifts
screening of for-hire drivers from local regulators to the companies
themselves . . . .”168 For example, no longer will taxis be required to
undergo county customer-service training and subject themselves to
government automobile inspections; however, taxi companies “will be
required to offer the same kind of app-based hailing software” that Uber
and Lyft offer.169 Just one day later, however, over 2,100 taxi medallion
owners in Miami-Dade filed a class action lawsuit in the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, alleging the following four
counts against the County: Count I – Violation of Right to Equal
Protection; Count II – Declaratory Judgment; Count III – Injunctive
Relief; and Count IV – Inverse Condemnation.170 The $1 billion classaction lawsuit was filed by Coral Gables attorney Ralph Patino, who, albeit
acknowledging sub-par service from many taxis in the City, demands
equal protections for taxi drivers under the new law, opining that the
County “is unfairly giving an advantage to deep-pocketed and tech-heavy
newcomers.”171
Despite the victory in Miami, Uber’s battles in Florida continue. After
a statewide campaign pushing for uniform legislation for ride-sharing
companies throughout the state of Florida, the Florida Senate decided at
the end of its legislative session in March 2016 to go another year without
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passing important ride-sharing legislation.172 Instead, counties and cities
are still burdened with the task of setting rules for these companies.173 This
has led to additional confusion regarding these inconsistent laws and
hindering the establishment of uniform, statewide insurance and safety
requirements for at least another year.174 Until the Florida Senate
overcomes the influential grip that entrenched special interests have over
its decisions can it truly act for the public welfare and safety of its citizens,
who will unfortunately be left without clarity as to ride-sharing regulations
until the next legislative session.

B.

Insurance Coverage

Since the first day ride-sharing companies burst their way through the
transportation market, long-standing taxi companies and city officials
have questioned the companies’ insurance coverage for drivers and
passengers. Uber clarified this ride-sharing insurance ambiguity in a blog
post on March 14, 2014.175 From the time a driver accepts a trip request on
the Uber app until the completion of the ride, Uber’s partners have $1
million of coverage for driver liability, covering drivers from trip
acceptance to passenger drop-off.176 In addition, if a driver’s personal
insurance policy is found not to cover an accident in between trips, Uber’s
new policy provides contingent coverage for a driver’s liability at the
highest requirement of any state in the U.S., providing coverage “for
bodily injury up to $50,000/individual/incident with a total of
$100,000/accident and up to $25,000 for property damage.”177
Generally, taxi companies have a “cap” on their insurance policies.178
“For example, in Chicago, taxicabs have a maximum of $350,000 perincident insurance policy”—meaning, even if a victim is critically injured,
that amount is the maximum he or she could recover.179 “Uber, [on the
other hand,] has implemented a $1 million uninsured-motorist policy that
provides passengers with added protection in the event of an accident,”
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offering much more liability coverage than traditional taxis.180 In Uber’s
prior arrangement, drivers were not covered for accidents occurring in
between trips—this period is commonly referred to as the “insurance
gap.”181 This coverage gap in Uber’s policy was discovered in 2014 on
New Year’s Eve in San Francisco, when an Uber driver struck and killed
a six-year-old girl. The driver had not accepted a request for a ride, so the
accident was not covered under Uber’s policy.182 Since then, Uber
addressed this issue by implementing the additional insurance described
above in its March 2014 update.183
Although Uber and other ride-sharing companies have made major
improvements to their insurance policies, drivers are still confused as to
whether they have to report claims to their personal insurance before Uber
will pay. This uncertainty leads many drivers to commit insurance fraud
by lying to their insurance companies about claims and their current work
status.184 The fact is that most personal insurers are “unwilling to cover
commercial activity,” and full commercial insurance “can cost up to 10
times as much as personal insurance.”185 This “don’t-ask-don’t-tell
strategy” employed by many Uber drivers generally works until they
become involved in an accident on the job.186 For example, it has been
reported that GEICO “tells agents to reject car-service app drivers and
refer them to GEICO’s fraud unit.”187 State Farm, although not banning
app-related claims outright, has stated that it is not comfortable insuring
people who use their cars primarily for ride-sharing work.188
Some of these coverage problems were resolved in Spring 2015, when
the first “hybrid insurance policies” became widely available.189 Drivers
with hybrid policies should no longer be forced to commit fraud on their
personal insurance, as the policies will be expressly aimed toward ridesharing drivers.190 As of August 2015, insurance companies such as
Allstate, Farmers, USAA, MetLife, and even GEICO are now offering
coverage for ride-for-hire drivers in the form of new policies or
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endorsements.191 In addition, California and Colorado have enacted new
laws that will make insurance provided by ride-sharing companies the
primary insurance affording coverage at all times while the app is turned
on. – i.e., “insurance that steps in first when one or more policy could
apply.”192 But neither the hybrid policies, nor the new laws require that the
ride-sharing apps’ collision insurance be primary—leaving collision
coverage very “spotty.”193

C.

Safety Concerns and Liability
1. Uber’s Safety Policies

On its website, Uber has an entire section dedicated to its safety
policies—promising the safest rides on the road.194 Uber promises that
from the moment riders request a ride until they arrive at their destinations,
the Uber experience is the safest available for riders, drivers, and the
residents of the cities in which Uber operates.195 With regard to rider
safety, all Uber drivers must go through a rigorous background check—a
three-step screening process, which includes county, federal and multistate checks.196 In addition, Uber’s screening process includes prospective
and regular checks of drivers’ motor vehicle records.197 In order for drivers
to pass Uber’s screening process, they cannot have committed any of the
following offenses within the past seven years: DUI or other drug related
or severe driving infractions, hit and runs, fatal accidents, history of
reckless driving, violent crimes, sexual offenses, gun related violations,
resisting/evading arrest, and driving without insurance or driving with a
suspended license in the past three years.198
As Uber struggles to address numerous complaints in dozens of cities,
one of the company’s biggest problems remains to be its screening process
for drivers. In San Francisco, an Uber driver was arrested for allegedly
striking a passenger on the head with a hammer during a dispute over the
route he was taking.199 Similarly, in Orlando, an Uber driver was arrested,
191
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and faced a possible battery charge, after a woman passenger said the
driver placed his hand inside her shirt during the ride.200 After the death of
a six-year-old girl on New Year’s Eve, Uber promised to improve its
screening process for drivers by, among other things, “cross-referencing
criminal databases and the national sex offender registry,” and monitoring
motor vehicle records more frequently.201 However, Uber’s efforts have
not been adequate enough for some city officials like the Los Angeles and
San Francisco District Attorneys, who filed a joint lawsuit against Uber on
December 9, 2014.202 The lawsuit accused Uber of making false and
misleading statements to passengers regarding the quality of background
checks it performed on drivers, seeking a permanent injunction requiring
Uber to stop violating California law.203
Also in December 2014, Uber received additional negative publicity
when an Uber driver allegedly raped a woman in India; subsequently, Uber
executives promised changes.204 Phillip Cardenas, Uber’s Head of Global
Safety, issued a statement addressing Uber’s “commitment to safety.”205
Specifically, Uber promised that the company would build new safety
programs and improve its existing ones throughout 2015.206 The items in
Uber’s plan include: custom tools for enhanced driver screening, Uber
Safety Advisory Board, a code of conduct for drivers, safety Incident
Response Teams around the world to provide 24/7 support in the event of
a safety incident, and advisory and training partnerships.207

2. Uber’s Liability for its Drivers: Independent Contractors or
Employees?
Uber’s liability (or lack thereof) for its drivers’ acts and conduct has
been one of the most controversial topics of the ride-sharing debate. Uber
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stresses that it “is not a transportation carrier” and it “does not provide
transportation services.”208 Instead, Uber has stated time and time again
that the drivers who sign up with Uber are independent contractors, and
therefore the “true transportation companies.”209 With regard to this
subject, Uber spokesman Taylor Bennett commented: “They’re
independent contractors . . . .We don’t hire drivers. We’re a technology
company. We provide the app that they use, that connects passengers with
drivers. They have the flexibility of being their own boss.”210 Because ridesharing companies do not “own” the vehicles, traditional liability
arguments typically directed toward an agency-like relationship may not
apply.211 Uber’s terms of service “make it clear over and over again that
they are not liable under any circumstances for bad things that might
happen when you use the service.”212
By classifying itself as a software company connecting drivers to
riders, Uber avoids having to pay its drivers minimum wage and overtime,
health care benefits, payroll taxes, or workers’ compensation insurance.213
This type of classification, however, is not uncommon; for example,
FedEx had “for years fought vigorously to defend its independent
contractor method of operation” until the Ninth Circuit Court ruled, in a
key decision, “that FedEx misclassified its drivers as independent
contractors.”214
The primary criteria the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses to
determine employee status is who “controls” the worker.215 According to
the IRS, “anyone who performs services for you is your employee if you

208

Browning, supra note 31, at 84.
Id.
210
Dick Hogan, Uber Ride Service Would Bring Controversy, NEWS-PRESS.COM (Sept.
10, 2014), http://www.news-press.com/story/money/2014/09/10/uber-ride-service-bringcontroversy/15421511/.
211
Browning, supra note 31, at 85.
212
Ellen Huet, Uber Rider Might Lose An Eye From Driver’s Hammer Attack. Could
Uber Be Held Liable?, FORBES: TECH (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellen
huet/2014/09/30/uber-driver-hammer-attack-liability/ [hereinafter Huet, Liability]. “YOU
EXPRESSLY WAIVE AND RELEASE THE COMPANY FROM ANY AND ALL ANY
LIABILITY, CLAIMS OR DAMAGES ARISING FROM OR IN ANY WAY RELATED
TO THE THIRD PARTY TRANSPORTATION PROVIDER.”
213
Celia Ampel, Uber Appeal Focuses on Question: Are Drivers Contractors or Not?,
DAILY BUS. REV. (May 29, 2015) at LEXIS.
214
Robert W. Wood, Florida Says Uber Drivers are Employees, But FedEx, Other Cases,
Promise Long Battle, FORBES: TAXES (May 26, 2015, 8:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/robertwood/2015/05/26/florida-says-uber-drivers-are-employees-but-fedex-othercases-promise-long-battle/.
215
Id.
209

2016-2017]

UBER V. REGULATION

105

can control what will be done and how it will be done.”216 In contrast, “an
individual is an independent contractor if the payer has the right to control
or direct only the result of the work and not what will be done and how it
will be done.”217 Accordingly, the factors that provide evidence of the
degree of control and independence for the IRS’s classification generally
fall into three categories – behavioral, financial, and the type of
relationship – all which must be weighed by employers determining
employment status.218 Misclassifying someone as an independent
contractor when they should have been classified as an employee could
result in the IRS imposing severe penalties and back taxes.219
To illustrate the significance of this classification for Uber, take Darrin
McGillis, a former Uber driver in Florida, who filed for unemployment
after he was involved in a car accident and subsequently discharged by
Uber.220 The Florida Department of Economic Opportunity agreed with
McGillis’ argument that he was a former employee, and not an
independent contractor, of Uber, thereby qualifying for unemployment
benefits.221 This type of decision, which is being mirrored in similar
lawsuits throughout the country, could drastically affect Uber’s business
model and cost the company millions.222 The existence of sharing
economy companies as digital platforms creates wrinkles in the law
regarding their liability when things go wrong. Until there is a court
opinion directly on the subject, the area of liability for companies like Uber
remains uncertain.
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POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR UBER AND ITS ADVERSARIES
TO COEXIST
New or Modified Laws

As existing laws cause problems for ride-sharing companies who
continue operating in most cities, there comes a point where either existing
laws must be modified to include these new kinds of services, or new laws
must be created. In current highly regulated cities like Miami, the truth is
that “innovation and regulation don’t mix.”223 That is so because regulated
industries, which discourage and even prohibit competition, operate
outside market-based schemes.224 Because innovative companies like
Uber act as a competitor, “they are directly or indirectly banned.”225
Simply put, there is no place for Uber as the law currently stands in heavily
regulated cities like Miami. To coexist with taxis, what Uber and other
ride-sharing companies need is new or modified legislation and regulation.
When President Lyndon Johnson created the Department of
Transportation in 1966, “he said that one of the agency’s goals would be
to ‘bring new technology to every mode of transportation.’”226 Nearly fifty
years later, Uber and its rival competitors are making that goal a reality.227
Innovative technology in the transportation industry gives people choices
in how they want to get around and whether they want to utilize the empty
space in their cars, the effects of which open “a channel for billions of
dollars in capital to spur economic growth and create new jobs.”228 By
allowing highly regulated industries with entrenched interests to “win,”
everyone else essentially loses out on choice—i.e., utilizing idle space in
your car, deciding not to own a car in an urban setting, or choosing the
manner in which you move safely from place to place.
By following the models of cities like Chicago, Denver, and
Washington D.C., officials in highly regulated cities can create legislation
that address the unique services that these ride-sharing companies offer.
Instead of treating these companies as “unlicensed taxi services,” as
Miami-Dade County has done for over one year, the County should follow
the states that have reached a compromise to allow these companies to
223
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legally operate. In fact, Uber’s own David Plouffe has publicly stated that
the company welcomes new regulations and wants to work alongside
lawmakers to establish “new ‘smart and modern’ laws that match what
companies like Uber and Lyft offer.”229 According to Plouffe, “Uber
should be regulated . . . .But with regulations that account for the fact that
this is different than hailing a taxi on a street, or calling a taxi on a landline
30 years ago.”230
The strong demand for alternatives in the transportation industry is
evident from the millions of users Uber has attracted in just five years of
existence. Currently, fourteen cities across the U.S. have established new
regulations specifically tailored for the unique services being offered by
ride-sharing companies. 231 And, as Uber continues to establish a
permanent place for itself in the transportation industry, other cities will
likely be following suit.

B.

Improved Safety Policies

Along with Uber’s successes came many controversies, especially in
2014. After several sexual assault allegations and incidents involving its
drivers, many city officials questioned Uber’s screening policies for its
drivers. Notably, Uber and its competitors “generally do not require their
drivers to submit to the kinds of background checks that local and state
regulators require for taxi operators.”232 In response to the criticisms
surrounding its screening policies after the string of controversies in 2014,
Uber publicly announced its commitment to change its current safety
procedures.233 Uber claims that its screening procedures, which are
engaged through the use of private security companies, are superior to
those offered by taxi companies.234 However, many regulators and law
enforcement officials disagree, stating that private screening companies
“often use incomplete or outdated databases that are less comprehensive
than traditional fingerprint-based checks, which are constantly
updated.”235
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Unlike the government background checks that taxi drivers are
subjected to, Uber does not require its drivers to undergo fingerprinting
and strongly opposes bills requiring the company to do so in order to
legally operate in a city.236 Fingerprinting databases can serve to alert taxi
companies to each new arrest of a driver.237 In contrast, Uber has to
regularly check in with the security firms in order to obtain updated
information on its drivers.238 After various lawsuits were filed against the
company, including the most recent class action filed by Uber riders
themselves, Uber clearly needs to update and improve its safety policies.239
Currently, if an individual wishes to become an Uber driver, he or she
simply submits his or her name and identification to the company for a
background check.240 However, those individuals do not have to prove that
the identity provided is actually theirs through, for example,
fingerprinting.241 “Someone with a criminal record could, in theory,
become an Uber driver using the identity of a sibling or a friend with a
clean history.”242 Uber’s chief security officer, Joe Sullivan, responded to
these public policy concerns in a July 2015 blog post on the company’s
website.243 Sullivan defends Uber’s background checks, which include a
social security trace and a criminal background check on approved drivers
in a series of national, state and local databases for addresses and
convictions within the last seven years.244 Upon identifying a criminal
record, the private company engaged to provide background checks (i.e.,
Accurate and/or Checkr ) sends a representative to the courthouse to pull
the record.245 Upon reviewing certain criteria, the potential driver will be
236
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subject to disqualification from using the Uber service.246 For example,
potential UberX drivers may be disqualified from Uber if the driver is
found to have had a total of three minor violations or incidents in the past
three years, including accidents and normal speeding tickets.247 Sullivan
concludes that although each background check system may have its own
flaws, “we believe that the procedures used by Uber . . . stack up well
against the alternatives in terms of safety—while not disadvantaging
people who may have been arrested but never charged.”248

C.

Address Insurance Discrepancies

With many Uber drivers committing insurance fraud by lying to their
personal insurance providers, it is clear that Uber needs to address certain
discrepancies in its policies. For starters, Uber does not currently offer
collision insurance for the time when a driver has the app on, but has not
accepted a request—the insurance gap period.249 If drivers happen to get
into an accident during that period, “their personal insurer could easily
deny the claim if they consider it commercial activity, and the driver would
be stuck paying for car repairs.”250
There are proposed solutions with regard to the insurance gap
problem. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
released a White Paper in 2015 regarding the issue and possible
solutions.251 The NAIC states that the ideal insurance solution for
Transportation Network Companies (TNC) “is for ride-hailing drivers to
have coverage on a full time basis available for all ride-hailing
activities.”252 Further, in order to achieve the NAIC’s coverage solution,
“the least complex approaches are that either the driver would purchase
commercial coverage or the TNC would provide full coverage for all three
TNC activity periods.”253 Other solutions proposed by the NAIC include
hybrid policies, modifying outdated laws to accommodate the TNC’s, and
creating new policy endorsements for existing policyholders.254 NAIC’s
recommended solutions, which are currently being implemented and
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utilized in several states, provide a potential “end” to one of ride-sharing’s
most persistent debates.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Sharing economy companies have disrupted (and continue to disrupt)
once established and stabilized industries around the world. These
companies offer significant fiscal, social, ecological, and entrepreneurial
benefits—including increasing jobs and bringing value to underutilized
space, skills, and items.255 Standing in the way of most sharing economy
companies’ potential for future growth are outdated regulations.256
Because the sharing economy is such a new concept, many city officials
have had difficulty dealing with how to regulate the unique sharing
companies. Further, many of the services offered by these companies
simply do not fit within existing regulations, but lie somewhere in
between. This legal gray area has created many challenges and obstacles
for those wishing to enter highly regulated markets.
From the age of railroads to the advent of computers, the maxim that
“[the] law will always be outpaced by the speed of technological
innovation” has been exemplified throughout history.257 Alongside
technological innovation comes uncertainty in the law. Just as laws have
had to change with technological advancements in the past, they will also
have to change with the advent of this new, on-demand economy. Instead
of fighting an inevitable change, regulators should embrace innovation and
find a way to coexist with the many companies of the sharing economy.
And consequently, innovation and regulation may be able to work (mix)
together after all.

255

Sarah Cannon & Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing Economy Can
Win Over Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/10/how-uberand-the-sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators/.
256
Id.
257
Browning, supra note 31, at 84.

